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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
THOMAS A. THOMAS*
During the period under survcy, several cases of first impression in
Florida appeared before the appellate courts in the fields under considera-
tion. One case dealt with the effect of adultery upon the right to dower.1
Another concerned the effectiveness of a no contest clause inserted in a
will.2 Still another considered the interpretation of "possessed of property"
tinder the venue statute in probate matters. 3 Several cases considered the
problems incident to will construction,4 particularly for the purpose of
detennining the application of ademption by cxtinction.- The constructive
trust as an equitable remedy was considered on several occasions.
Although the courts considered several phases of the law of trusts and
succession, the legislature was apparently too occupied with problems of
constitutional revision to consider these fields to any great extent. The
1959 legislature enacted oiily eight statutory changes in the fields under
discussion. The nature of the changes made, indicates that the legislature
was motivated by specific problems rather than by a desire to examine and
improve the law generally as applied to the fields of trusts and succession.
LEGISLATION
By a 1959 statute,6 inter vivos trusts can be added to by testamentary
disposition without fear that the statute of wills is violated. This is
true although the settlor of the inter vivos trust reserved the power to
amend and to revoke. Other statutes:7 undertake to establish fees for
multiple personal representatives of not less than one or more than two
commissions established by statute for single personal representatives;8 allow
a widow 60 days to elect dower from the date extended by the county
judge for the filing of claims by creditors or from the time allowed a
personal representative to file objections to a claim or from the date of
final judgment on a litigated claim; 1 permit deferrment of payments due
under the probate laws to alien beneficiaries where it appears the beneficiary
*Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. Was v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958).
2. Kolb v. Levy, 110 So.2d 25 (Fla. App. 1959).
3. In re Estate of Klipp[c, 101 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1958).
4. Parker v. Parker. 110 So.2d 498 (Fla. App. 1959); Singleton v. IMartin, 110
So.2d 421 (Fla. App. 1959); Filkins v. Gurney, 108 So.2d 57 (Fla. App. 1959); Pan-
coast v. Pancoast, 107 So.2d 787 (Fla. App. 1958).
5. Park Lane Presbyterian Church v. Estate of llenry, 106 So.2d 215 (Fla. App.
1958); see Note, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv. 110 (1959).
6. M~a. Laws 1959, ch. 59-57.
7. FLA. STAT. § 734.01(1)(d)(1959).
8. FLA. STAT. § 734.01(1) (a)(1959).
9. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(1) 1959).
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would not have the benefit and control of the property;"0 avoid the
necessity of filing accounts and vouchers with accountings; t' permit the
entry of an order of administration unnecessary at any stage of the
administration process;' 2 exempt proceeds of insurance policies outside the
estate from claims of creditors except when there is no surviving spouse
or child;'3 and authorize the courts to appoint auditors to audit accounts
of trustees.' 4
DEcIsIoNs
Wrongful Conduct
In the absence of statute, abandonment alone does not deprive a
surviving spouse of her right to dower. However, according to the Statute
of Westminister II,"' if a wife left her husband and lived in adultery she
was barred from her dower right' unless her husband condoned her conduct
and permitted her to return to his house. Some states'0 have adopted
similar statutory provisions while others' 7 regard the Statute of West-
minister II as part of their common law. In a case of first impression
in Florida,"' the District Court of Appeal for the Third District has
adopted the position that adultery does not deprive a spouse of dower.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court held that the Statute of West-
minister II is not a part of the common law in Florida since it was adopted
at a time when divorce a vinculo matrimonii was not available for adultery
and since the purpose of the Statute was to provide a husband with a
remedy in the event his wife left him and lived in adultery.'0 This
reasoning might be acceptable were it not for the fact that the husband
might not survive long enough to procure a divorce.
It appears reprehensible to permit a wife to share in her husband's
estate after she has voluntarily abandoned her husband's home and lived
in adultery.
The dower right is conditioned upon the marital relationship and a
wife who is guilty of such gross misconduct should be deemed to have
10. FtA. STAT. § 731.28 (1959).
11. ILA. STAT. §§ 733.43, 733.44, 73346, 733.47, 733.49 (1959).
12. FLA. STAT. § 735.051 (1959).
13. t.A. STAT. § 222.13 (1959).
14. FLA. STAT. § 737.12 (1959).
15. 13 Edw, I, c. 34 (1285).
16. See 3 \RNTiU., AMr'IRIcAN FAMIT.Y LA w §§ 202, 221 (1935).
17. Schmeizl v. Schneizl. 186 Md. 371, 46 A.2d 619 (1946); Heicher v. Nlysinger,
184 Tenn. 226, 1986 S.W.2d 330 (1946).
18. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958).
19. Id. at 57: "We are impressed, upon reading of the cases decided in other states,
with the probability that the reason fur the enactment of the Statute of Westminster
II, was to provide a husband with a remedy in case his wife left him and lived in
adultery with another man. And that by the law of England as it existed ii 1285,
adultery did not constitute a ground for divorce a vinculo matrinonii and thus did
not constitute a basis for barring a wife of her caim of dower . . . No other reason
for the passage of the statute is advanced by the briefs nor can be gleaned from the
cases. It is apparent that the legislation of this state has covered all of the respective
rights involved in the Statute of Westminster I[ ....
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severed that relationship and consequently precluded from benefiting from
it. However, this appears to be a problem calling for legislative action.
Wrongful Conduct of a Creditor Toward Debtor
It is too well established to warrant extensive discussion that a person
cannot profit from his own wrongdoing. It is equally well established
that a person cannot be deemed to have forfeited his estate for the
commission of a felony. Both of these principles found application in the
recent case of Morgenstern v. Ruza.20 In that case a wife obtained two
judgments in New York against her husband. Later these judgments were
established as Florida judgments. The Florida court also awarded the
wife, in her action for divorce, a $5,000 lump sum alimony payable
$15 per week. The wife killed her husband and was convicted of man-
slaughter. In establishing the wife's rights in her husband's estate, the
court concluded that the two judgments which were vested in the wife
prior to her wrong were valid claims against tle estate of the husband,
however, the $5,000 lump sum alimony was not since it was not a debt
at the time of the husband's death and could not be made a debt by
the wife's wrongful conduct.
Appointment of Administrator
The venue of probate of wills and the granting of letters of admini-
stration is in any county in which the decedent was possessed of any
property if the decedent was not a domiciliary of Florida at the time of his
death.21 It is generally agreed that for the purpose of the appointment
of an administrator, the decedent is deemed possessed of property if he held
liability indemnity insurance in a Florida insurance company, or an insurance
company authorized to do business in Florida.22 However, if the insurance
company is not authorized to do business in Florida, the Florida courts
are not authorized to issue letters of administration for the non-resident
decedent. Thus, when a nion-resident defendant died after an action was
instituted against him growing out of an automobile accident, the fact
that he held liability indemnity insurance in a foreign corporation not
authorized to do business in Florida, did not authorize the appointment
of an administrator in Florida. 23
No Contest Clause
Jurisdictions are in conflict as to the efficacy of no contest clauses
inserted in wills. The modern view of text writers and the courts is against
20. 101 Sold 429 (Fla. App. 1958).
21. FLA. STAT. § 732.06(2) (1959).
22. Furst v. Brady, 375 I11. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940); In re Fagin's Estate,
105 (1938); Robinson v. Dana's Estate, 87 N.H1 114, 174 At]. 772 (1934).
105; Robinson v. Dana's Estate, 87 N.H. 114, 174 Atl. 772 (1934).
23. In re Estate of Klipple, 101 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1958).
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the validity of no contest clauses upon the ground that they are contrary
to public policy.24 According to the rationale employed, any attempt to
discourage resort to a legal remedy is inconsistent with public policy. Other
jurisdictions appear to give lip service only to forfeiture provisions of wills.
Vhile they state no contest clauses are valid, they acknowledge that such
clauses must be strictly construed and as thus construed do not preclude
a contest made in good faith and upon probable cause. ' 5 The rationale
employed being that the testator could not have intended to prevent a
beneficiary from having his doubtful rights judicially determined. Thus in
KoIb v. Levy, 26 where the plaintiff filed a claim against the estate for
breach of contract for failure to execute a will in his favor, the court held
that the plaintiff was not precluded from taking under the will executed
in his favor since the claim was not a contest within the purview of the
no contest clause.
Will Construction
The Florida appellate courts have on numerous occasions acknowledged
that in the construction of wills, the intent of the testator is the polar
star by which courts are guided. The intent of the testator is to be ascertained
by considering the entire will and not an isolated segment only. If the will
is unambiguous, the words employed by the testator will be given their
ordinary meaning since the court will assume that the testator meant
what he said.
If any doubt exists from the reading of the will as to the testator's
intent, it is proper to consider all circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will, the condition, nature and extent of the property devised, the
testator's relationship and attitude toward the members of his family and to
the beneficiaries under the will and in general, the relationship of all parties
concerned.27
Under certain circumstances, the practical interpretation placed on a
will by the parties in interest for a long period of time will be accepted
by the courts.28
During the period under survey there were several cases involving
the application of the foregoing principles. Thus, where the testatrix created
a residuary trust for the benefit of her sons or the surviving son, it was
held that upon the death of one son his interest did not pass to his widow
or children since the intent of the testatrix, which is controlling, clearly
24. 2 Stn,.s, FUTURE INTERESTS (1st ed. 1936).
25. THOMPSON, CONSTRUCTION OF WILS 676-78 (2d ed. 1936).
26. 110 So.2d 25 (Fla. App. 1959).
27. lies v. lies, 158 FIa. 493, 29 So.2d 21 (1947); Marshall v. lewett, 156
Fla. 645, 24 So.2d 1 (1945); Roberts v. Niosely, 100 FIa. 267, 129 So. 835 (1930);
See also In re Thompson's Estate, 161 Kan. 641, 171 P.2d 294 (1946).
28. 2 SCIIOULER, \ILtS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS § 841 (6th ed. 1923).
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indicated that her sons alone should benefit.2 9 In the words of the court,
"The fundamental and controlling axiom is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the testator as gathered from what was written in the will. In
order to do this the court should as nearly as humanly possible try to put
itself in the place of, or the armchair of, the testator. °30
Similarly, when testatrix created a life estate in her husband with
provision for the remainder to be divided equally between her daughter
and son, the daughter's interest was held to be a vested interest descendible
in favor of her husband upon her father's death where the daughter
predeceased her father.3' In holding to that effect, the court declared,
"Testamentary intention is the polar star by-which wills are to be construed
and in that task the words used by the testator must be given their commonly
accepted meaning and that meaning applied in accordance with law."32
In a case of first impression in Florida, a testatrix devised and be-
queathed a portion of her estate to a beneficiary "for and during her
natural life, she using the income, and if necessary so much of the property
itself to sustain and maintain herself in a good and comfortable way and
manner." It was contended that the life tenant was not to be the sole
judge as to the amount needed to support her in a comfortable manner,
but that an objective standard should be employed. However, the Florida
court subscribed to what appears to be the prevailing view which is to
the effect that dispositions by the life tenant are valid irrespective of her
needs so long as she acts in good faitb.l This view, according to the court,
best effectuates the intent of the testatrix.
Contract to Will and Mutual Wills
Since January 1, 1958, all contracts to execute a will must be in
writing and signed by the party whose personal representative is to be
charged. 4 Insofar as the statute applies to agreements entered into prior
to its effective date, it is violative of the constitutional guarantee against
the impairment of the obligation of contract. Before the statute became
effective, oral agreements to execute wills were sustained. However, the
person alleging the existence of such an agreement had to sustain the
burden of proof by definite, cogent and convincing evidence. The mere fact
that parties executed mutual wills did not alone indicate the existence of
a contract. Therefore, no presumption was created by the mere existence
of mutual wills and the person alleging the existence of a contract had
the burden of proof.
29. Pancoast v. Pancoast, 107 So.2d 787 (Fla. App. 1958).
30. Id. at 789.
31. Singleton v. Martin, 110 So.2d 421 (Fla. App. 1959).
32. Id. at 422.
33. Richards v. 'West, 110 So.2d 698 (Fla. App. 1959).
34. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1959).
1960]
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Mutual wills, like others, are ambulatory in nature and revocability
is an essential characteristic. Although a mutual will is based upon a valid
contract, it is still revocable, however, the contract is valid and enforceable
although there is no provision "not to revoke." If the contract is valid, a
provision not to revoke will be implied35
Classification of Devises and Bequests
Devises and bequests are classified as either residuary, general, specific
or demonstrative. The purpose for this classification are threefold: (1) to
determine liability for the debts and obligations of the testator under
abatement statutes; (2) to determine the applicability of ademption by
extinction; (3) to determine entitlement to income derived subsequent
to the will's execution and during the administration process.
A specific devise or bequest is a gift by will of property which is
particularly designated and which is to be satisfied only by the receipt'of
the particular property described.38 Income received during administration
from property specifically devised enures to the benefit of the specific devisee.
A general devise or bequest is not limited to any particular property
and can be satisfied out of the general assets of the estate. The income
received from property which is the subject matter of a general devise
passes into the residue of the estate. These principles recently found
application in the factually interesting case of In re Estate of Parker.""
The testator bequeathed 155 shares of stock to his three daughters and 100
shares in the same corporation to his wife. Twenty-one months prior to
his death, the testator received an additional 255 shares of stock in the
corporation as a result of a stock split. In holding that the specific legatees
were entitled to the additional shares of stock, the court declared:
The pronounced tendency of the courts has been to hold, upon
the slightest evidence of testamentary intent, that bequests of
corporate stock are sufficiently clothed with the characteristics of
a specific bequest as to avoid abatement or ademption either in
value or in kind.38
The reason for the court's holding was based upon the conclusion
that a stock split is a mere change in form and not in substance, conse-
quently, it is more consistent with the testator's intent that additional
shares resulting from the split should pass under a specific bequest of
the original shares,39
35. Keith v. Culp, IIl So.2d 278 (Fla. App. 1959).
36. RiTFEAnN, V.I.S AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 231 (3d
ed. 1957).
37. 110 So.2d 498 (Fla. App. 1959).
38. Id. at 502.
39. See In re Vail's Estate, 67 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953).
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Constructive Trust
A constructive trust is a remedial device created by a court of equity
for the purpose of preventing fraud or unjust enrichment. One of the
circumstances giving rise to its creation occurs when a person acquires title
to property by means of a confidential relationship under circumstances
which indicate that retention of the property will result in an injustice. No
definite meaning has been attributed to the term "confidential relationship"
in order to afford the courts sufficient flexibility to balance the equities
in particular cases. Thus, when a son conveyed his interest in his father's
estate to his mother upon her oral promise to leave the entire estate
(inherited from the father) to her son, relief will be granted in the form
of a constructive trust based upon the confidential relationship between
mother and son.4 0
Resulting Trust
A resulting trust is one created by a court of equity based upon the
inferred intent of the parties. It is generally created when an attempt to
create an express trust fails; or when the purpose of a trust has been fulfilled
and no disposition made of the remainder, or when one person pays the
consideration for property and has title taken in the name of another
under circumstanceswhich indicate no gift was intended. This latter type
is referred to as a purchase money resulting trust. Thus, when a husband
and wife agreed to purchase property jointly, however, title was taken
in the name of the husband, a tenancy by the entireties was created with
the husband taking title as trustee for himself and his wife. 4'
Compensation of Trustees
At the early common law in England, trustees were not entitled to
compensation since it was deemed to be an honor to act in such a high
fiduciary capacity. Today in the United States it is agreed that trustees
are entitled to be compensated for services rendered unless a contract
was executed waiving the right of remuneration. In the absence of statute,
the amount of compensation is discretionary with the chancellor who will
consider all relevant facts in determining reasonable compensation. Among
the facts considered are: (1) the skill exhibited by the trustee, (2) the
success of his administration and, (3) the amount of work involved and
the degree of responsibility imposed upon him.
40. Williams v. Grogan, 100 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1958). See also Traub v. Traub,
102 So.2d 157 (Fla. App. 1958). Three brothers were the owners of property. One
brother agreed to pay the taxes due on the property and to hold it in trust for himself
and the other brothers who could pay their proportionate liability for the taxes when
they were financially able. Later, the two brothers tendered their share of the taxes
and demanded conveyance of their share of the property which was refused. Held:
a constructive trust would be created in order to prevent an inequity.
41. Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So2d 627 (Fla. 1958).
1960]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the compensation of
the trustee is to be satisfied out of income unless otherwise provided by
the settlor.42 Thus, where the settlor evidenced an intent to preserve the
corpus of the trust, the compensation of the trustee would be satisfied
out of income.43 When there are two or more trustees, the amount of
compensation will ordinarily be the same as if there were only one unless
otherwise provided by the trust or by statute.44
Alienability of Beneficial Interest of a Trust
It is generally agreed that the beneficiary's interest in a trust is
assignable by him in the absence of a contrary intent by the settlor.
Restraints upon alienation can be either expressed or implied. If the settlor
expressly provides for restraints upon voluntary and involuntary alienation,
the trust is referred to as a spendthrift trust. If a trust is created for the
support and maintenance of the beneficiary, a restraint upon alienation is
implied from the purpose. If the settlor authorizes the trustec, in his
discretion, to deprive the beneficiary of all income a discretionary trust
is created and the beneficiary has no interest which he can assign until the
trustee's discretion has been exercised in his favor.45
Method of Distribution
When a person dies intestate leaving surviving children and grand-
children from a predeceased child, the question is presented, how should
the estate be divided? Should the children and grandchildren share equally
or per capita? Or should the estate be divided per stirpes or according
to the number of decedent's children? According to the prevailing view,
when the members of the class of takers under the laws of descent and
distribution are of equal degree of relationship, the division should be
per capita or equal. However, in Florida by statute,46  division of an
intestate's estate is always per stirpes. Thus, where aii intestate left as his
only survivors nephews and nieces from predeceased brothers and sisters,
it was held that the per stirpes method of distribution would be used. 47
Compensation of Personal Representatives
Personal representatives who have satisfactorily administered al estate,
are entitled to the statutory compensation without further proof.48 If a
42. FLA. S'rA'r. § 690.13(1)(1959).
43. West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Florida Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 100 So2d
807 (Fla. 1958).
44. Ibid.
45. See Philp v. Trainor, 100 So.2d 181 (Fi. App. 1958).
46. FLA. STA'r. § 731.25 (1959).
47. In re Estate of Davol, 100 So.2d 188 (FIa. App. 1958).
48. In re Estate of Lieber, 103 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1958).
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personal representative performs extraordinary services, he is entitled to
additional compensation depending upon the value of those extraordinary
services. In determining the value of such services, the court should
consider other fees, commissions or compensations paid in the administration
process.40
A personal representative who properly incurs legal expenses is entitled
to reimbursement. The value of an attorney's services to an estate, should
be determined only after receiving testimony of competent disinterestd
attorneys. If the personal representative is himself an attorney, he is entitled
to compensation for legal services rendered to the estate." If he is a
member of a law firm, it is completely proper for him to employ a member
of his firm to perform services for the estate.51
Widow's Allowance
In cases of necessity, a widow is entitled to an allowance for her
maintenance and support from the estate of her deceased husband.5 2 In
the event the allowance provided by statute is inadequate, the county
judge is authorized to grant a supplemental allowance.51 The purpose of
the allowance provisions of the statutes is obviously to sustain the widow
during the administration of the estate and prior to distribution. If a widow
executes a prenuptial agreement, and later, contests its validity, her right
to a widow's allowance is not barred prior to a determination of the
validity of the agreement. 4
49. Ibid.
50. FLA. SrAr. § 734.01(4)(1959).
51. See note 48 supra.
52. FLA. STAT. § 733,20(d) (1959).
53. FLM. STAT. § 733.20(i) (1959).
54. In re Estate of Stein, 106 So.2d 2 (F12. App. 1958).
